It seems that mental disturbances have served as valid excuses from liability and punishment from time immemorial. In the Iliad, King Agamemnon disowns his offending actions by claiming that
It was not I that did it: Zeus and Fate, and Erinys that walks in darkness struck me mad when we were assembled on the day that I took from Achilles the prize that had been awarded to him. What could I do? All things are in the hand of heaven, and Folly [Ate], eldest of Zeus' daughters, shuts men's eyes to their destruction.
1 Whether explained as possession by gods or demons, or in the naturalistic way of the Galenic school 2 as a disease of the brain, ancient law usually put persons with obvious mental disorders in the care of their families and exempted them from criminal responsibility, though not necessarily from civil liability. This is also reflected in Plato's Laws (IX, 864) and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1111a). Ancient Roman law regarded the insane (furiosi), like children, as incompetent to act because compotes mentis non sunt, hence, they were not responsible for a crime, even for patricide or homicide, unless committed in a lucidum intervallum. It was also said that their ill fate excused them or that they were already punished by their madness.
3 Medieval Canon law followed Roman doctrine 4 , which was reinforced by the Augustinian teaching that sin requires voluntariness which is lacking in those qui usu rationis carent.
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The Continental European ius commune kept the Roman doctrines and phrases, extended the reason of doli incapacitas from wild beasts and children to the insane, and added the humane consideration that those who already are suffering from illness should not be further burdened by punishment: However, this applies only to perfect madness or 'total alienation of the mind' with the traditional exception of lucid intervals, whereas partial insanity is not an excuse because, as Hale remarked, most felons 'are under a degree of partial insanity when they commit these offenses ' . 15 Blackstone reasoned that all crimes are constituted by a 'vitious will' and an overt unlawful act 'consequent upon such vitious will'. 16 Thus there can be no crime in cases in which 'the will does not join with the act', for instance because of a 'general defect of understanding, like infancy, idiocy, lunacy, and intoxiction'. 
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This also applies when a sane offender becomes mad after he committed an act of treason. The common law held that he cannot be executed; a 'cruell and inhuman' statute of Henry VIII which allowed such execution, was soon repealed because 'the execution of the offender is for example … but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreame inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others. ' 
Comparative Survey
It has been alleged that the 'effect of insanity on criminal responsibility is an issue which is common to all human societies' , 20 however, the practical effects vary considerably and this discord has increased even more in the past 30 years. To date, a comparative survey 21 shows that there are three basic approaches to deal with mental disorders as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility (I will not address the procedural dimension, i.e. unfitness to stand trial), namely:
(1) The overwhelming majority of legal orders accept mental disorder as separate ground -mostly labelled 'excuse' or 'defence' -for excluding criminal responsibility. Although the criteria look very similar, the resulting practical differences range from very restrictive application, notably in the English-speaking world, to fairly frequent use in some civil law countries.
(2) A small group of legal orders -a couple of American states -admits mental disorders only insofar as they constitute mistake or involuntariness, i.e. negate the requirement of intent or, rather in theory than in practice, of a voluntary act.
(3) Another small group -mainly Sweden which, however, is gradually returning to the mainstream -adopted a unified system of social control in which mental disorders are only relevant to determine the suitable kind of treatment of the offender.
Mental Disorder as Complete Excuse
The majority of legal orders consider a certain soundness of mind at the time of the commission of the offence to be a fundamental prerequisite of criminal responsibility. is commonly linked to naïve conceptions of freedom of will, i.e. the ability to choose between right and wrong. If that condition is not present due to a mental disorder, no crime exists and no punishment ensues. 22 This category of 'guilt' has constitutional status in some states (Germany, Italy, Canada; not in the U.S.).
Criteria

One-dimensional/single criterion tests ('Medical Approach')
There is at least one state -maybe today (see French Code pénal of 1810) only one -, Norway, 23 which uses a one-dimensional medical approach. This means that the mere presence of e.g. a psychosis, in the sense of a significantly disturbed relationship to reality at the time of committing the criminal act, is sufficient to exempt the accused from punishment. A possible explanation of this approach is that it rests on the tacit, irrebuttable presumption that the accused's conduct was 'the product' of his mental disorder or that the mere possibility of the illness having contributed to the conduct is deemed sufficient, 24 in light of the assumed difficulty or impossibility to prove that causal link. 
Dualist tests ('Mixed Approach')
Most legal orders employ what by some writers has been called the 'biological-psychological method' , 26 i.e. a test comprising two criteria. The first is a descriptive one relating to some mental defects while the second is a psychological or functional one requiring certain inabilities as a result of the mental defect. As a consequence, a third criterion is tacitly implied, namely the causal connection between mental disorder and functional impairment.
Biological and Medical Categories: Type of Disorder
The descriptions of the mental disorders in the first prong of the test often use colloquial expressions like 'insanity' in English or 'démence' in French. Sometimes old terms, common even in 19th century medical parlance which today would appear derogatory and unsuitable, like 'madness' , 'lunacy' , 'idiocy' , 'debility' or 'mental abnormality' , are still used. Older laws often treated deaf-mutes like the insane. The cause of the mental disorder mostly is of no concern, whether it is a 'disease of the mind' or psychosis like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, but also epilepsy, somnambulism, certain psychoneuroses, hyper-and hypoglycemia etc., or a 'defect' or 'natural mental infirmity' the person was born with, like abnormally low intellect, cf. Model Penal Code § 4.01(1): 'mental disease or defect' . Some formulations are so broad as to cover temporary disabilities like intoxication (e.g. Continental European countries) whereas others are eager to exclude self-induced disturbances, notably substance abuse 27 or 'repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct' ( § 4.01(2) MPC). If a legal distinction is made between insanity and intoxication, as in the Common Law tradition, the border zone of alcoholism, delirium tremens or singular events of alcoholic psychosis is likely to pose problems. 28 It is noteworthy that most 29 of these descriptions are made in legal terms and not in medical or clinical terms. Nowhere, I have found references to international classificatory schemes like the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases) of the World Health Organization or the DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, 5th edition, 2013) of the American Psychiatric Association. This separation of legal from medical descriptors has the obvious advantage of freeing the law from the vagaries of the development of the medical sciences -avoiding the problems created by outdated terminology which plague § 20 of the German Criminal Code ('pathological mental disorder, profound consciousness disorder, debility or any other serious mental abnormality'). On the other side, the separation has the obvious disadvantage of potentially missing essential features of the relevant phenomena and of creating permanent problems of translation in the legal evaluation of expert opinions. 
Psychological/Functional Impairments
The second prong of the test frequently is more controversial than the first one. The second criterion has the task to examine whether the mental disorder eliminated a necessary condition of criminal responsibility or not. Whereas older rules asked whether 'free will' or the 'freedom to act' was destroyed, 30 most modern formulations ask for specific cognitive and/or volitional defects which affect the normal functioning of the mechanism of the naïve model of action implicit in the concept of criminal conduct. Practically nowhere, 31 the modern psychiatric definition of mental illness as 'a pervasive inability to engage in reality' 32 has been adopted.
Civil Law
Many civil law jurisdictions, including Russia and the Far East as well as Islamic law, are fairly uniform in employing an alternative test which asks if the defendant was unable either to understand the (legal) wrongfulness of his conduct (cognitive defect) -this is nothing else than a mistake of law due to the medical condition -or to act in accordance with his appreciation of the wrongness of his conduct (volitional/conative defect): 
Common Law
The situation is more complicated in legal orders belonging to the English law tradition. The English law on insanity is still governed by the so-called M'Naghten rules of 1843. The Law Commission has published a discussion paper in 2013, 33 but no final report and no legislative action has ensued so far. The Scottish woodturner Daniel M'Naghten suffered from the paranoid delusion that he was being persecuted by the Tories. Consequently, he attempted to kill the Prime Minister Peel, but by mistake shot his private secretary Edward Drummond who died five days later. M'Naghten was found 'not guilty' of murder, on the ground of insanity, and spent the rest of his life, 21 years, in lunatic asylums. The acquittal caused a public outcry because of its leniency and Queen Victoria feared that cranks and radicals could be encouraged to make attempts on her life. The House of Lords asked the judges of Queen's Bench to advise them on the relevant legal principles and the resulting answer, in essence, was this: 
the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing: or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong …
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Apart from their questionable authority as advisory opinion, the M'Naghten rules were controversial from the outset 36 and remain so until today. 37 This is both because they reduce the issue of insanity to a case of cognitive defect belonging to the categories of innocent mistake of fact or law and disregard the possibility that mental disorders may also affect, as Stephen put it, 'the emotions and the will ' . 38 In some common law jurisdictions, the M'Naghten rules were supplemented by a volitional prong like an 'irresistible impulse' test already used in earlier English cases.
39
The majority of Commonwealth jurisdictions today recognise cognitive defects alongside volitional ones, 40 although the practical experiences vary widely. Variations also occur in the cognitive prong, whether accused must only 'know' or 'appreciate' i.e. understand what he is doing, whether the distinction of right and wrong refers to legal or moral wrongness, and e.g. whether persons acting on divine commandments or 'deific decrees' shall count as insane.
In the United States of America, the development of the law on insanity took a somewhat different and, in recent times, more disturbing course. The M'Naghten rules were readily accepted and in some places combined with an 'irresistible impulse' test. In A majority of state criminal laws, as well as federal circuit courts subsequently followed the Model Code more or less closely. Yet, quite a number of critical voices, among them President Nixon, advocated the abolition of the insanity defence for a variety of reasons, notably its 'unconscionable abuse' (Nixon) which let too many wrongdoers escape punishment. 42 The opponents gained momentum after 1981 when John Hinckley tried to murder President Reagan in order to gain the attention of the actress Jodie Foster and was acquitted on the ground of volitional incapacity under the MPC test adopted by the D.C. circuit court. 43 The Most state criminal laws followed this backlash by reducing the substantive scope of the insanity defence, shifting the burden of proof or abolishing it altogether (see below sub 2.2). United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. p. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981 ), aff ' d, 672 F.2d p. 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982 Pub. L. 98-473, title II, § 402(a), Oct. 12, 1984 , 98 Stat. 2057 renumbered § 17, Pub. L. 99-646, § 34(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3599 , codified in 18 U.S.C. § 17.
Burden of Proof, Role of Expert Testimony
Legal orders of the civil law type, with an inquisitorial criminal procedure, examine the issue of imputabilitas ex officio. Usually, the burden of proof for all ingredients of the offence is placed on the state which has to prove that the defendant had the requisite state of imputabilitas, here soundness of mind, at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. This is often based on the presumption of innocence and in some countries has constitutional status.
English law 45 and the vast majority of its descendants, 46 however, proceed from a legal presumption of sanity which defendant has to rebut. More precisely, the defendant not only bears an evidential (evidentiary, provisional) burden to adduce some evidence of his insanity, but also bears the legal or persuasive (ultimate, probative) burden to establish his insanity on a balance of probabilities. An early American case 47 and the Model Penal Code rejected this view and only placed the evidential burden on the accused who must introduce evidence supporting his claim of insanity, while the prosecutor must then disprove this affirmative defence and establish defendant's responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. 48 This view has not acquired constitutional status in the U.S., 49 however, arguably because the traditional divide between elements of the offence on the one hand and defences on the other seems to have obscured the simple truth that all defences merely negate necessary conditions of responsibility so that soundness of mind is a 'fact constituting the offense'.
After the Hinckley verdict, the IDRA placed the legal burden on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was legally insane. 50 Also, a number of American States require proof of insanity by a preponderance of evidence, with the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Expert testimony is universally employed when mental disorders are at issue in court, but it seems that in most jurisdictions courts are not bound to follow the experts' opinion. It also seems to be a widespread if not universal experience that communication Arizona, 548 U.S. p. 735, 769; 126 S.Ct. p. 2709; 165 L.Ed.2d p. 842 (2006) . between medical experts and judges or juries is notoriously difficult and that the reliability of expert testimony is equally questionable as the courts' frequently uncritical reliance thereon.
52 These are inherent structural difficulties because the legal concepts of criminal responsibility and lack thereof, viz. insanity, can neither completely nor partially be reduced to or translated into medical categories and vice versa. 53 
Legal Consequences (Verdict, Civil Commitment)
In most European countries, a defendant found irresponsible will be acquitted. France replaced the acquittal in 2008 54 by an arrêt portant déclaration d'irresponsabilité pénale pour cause de trouble mental 55 which is said to better accommodate the victims' interests. 56 In the common law world, the traditional verdict 'not guilty by reason of insanity' has since the mid-1980s been replaced in some 20 American states by the oxymoronic formulas 'guilty but insane' or 'guilty but mentally ill' .
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The legal consequence of an acquittal is that the accused goes unpunished. In most legal orders, an acquittal does not hinder protective measures (terminology varies: special sanctions, civil commitment etc.) like the commitment to a psychiatric institution if the accused is deemed dangerous. This is why, at least in Germany, defendants are said to be reluctant to raise the issue of insanity because most of them fear the stigma of insanity and the prospect of long-term confinement far more than ordinary prison. Commitment proceedings can be separate or integrated in the criminal trial. In England until 1991, the special verdict of insanity resulted in mandatory and indefinite commitment to a mental hospital; today, a hospital order, supervision or total discharge are in the court's discretion. In the second half of the 20th century, psychiatric treatment underwent substantial criticisms and reforms, and the liberty interests of institutionalised persons were strengthened. At least in the U.S., a large numbers of persons found 'not guilty by reason of insanity' are said to have been released after a rather short hospital time, a fact that has undermined public acceptance of the insanity defence. The novel 'guilty but mentally ill' verdict leads to punishment and in some, but not all states, also to psychiatric treatment of the convict. . In 1965, Sweden adopted legislation that followed the concept of individual or special prevention, focused on treatment and turned away from notions like guilt and punishment associated with moral blame. The more radical draft of 1956 even eliminated the term 'punishment' altogether. 67 Hence, a mentally ill person can be prosecuted and convicted of a crime, provided he was able to form the necessary intent or to act negligently, but the mental disorder can mitigate the severity of the legal consequence and usually excludes prison sentences: 
Partial Excuse/'Diminished Responsibility'
Many legal orders, mostly of the civil law type, recognise that imputabilitas, criminal responsibility, is a matter of degree so that punishment will be reduced in accordance with the degree of incapacity caused by the mental disorder.
68 Common law countries traditionally only accepted a defence of diminished responsibility with regard to homicide, where it reduced a murder charge to manslaughter. Today's state of the law is very varied and often confused. 
Final Remarks
The interest of the public and of policy-makers in the excuse or defence of insanity, usually at its peak in the aftermath of acquittals in widely-publicised murder cases, by far exceeds its practical significance: While the defence of insanity is rarely raised and even less frequently successful in the common law world -there are said to be only around 15 successful insanity pleas in crown courts in England and Wales per year.
70 Its use appears to be somewhat more frequent in civil law countries, notably the partial excuse of diminished responsibility due to intoxication -in 2013 in Germany, out of 935,788 accused, 749 (0.08%) were found totally irresponsible and 17,968 (1.9%) partially irresponsible. 71 Also, it is an interesting as well as discomforting observation that modern times seem to be significantly less tolerant towards incompetent agents, like mentally ill offenders, than the previous two millennia. In contrast to all those beneficent achievements of scientific, notably medical progress, the understanding of what criminal law is all about apparently still leaves much to be desired when in some parts of the world many lawyers 
